This article examining case studies of three types of fragile states: those that are stuck in a fragility trap, those that have exited fragility and are now emergent and stabilised, and those that have moved in and out of fragility—all between 1980 and 2010. The study was premised on the idea that state fragility is a convergence of structural changes and events that might include large-scale conflict, disengaged leadership, failure to provide long-term service delivery, or the loss of legitimacy leading to political collapse.
Its main objective was to find out why, over the past three decades, some countries previously considered fragile have successfully recovered and become resilient, functional, and effective while others have been less successful in doing so. The case studies chosen included: Pakistan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo; Guatemala and Mozambique; and Mali and Senegal.
Key Findings:
- In evaluating the data over more than a thirty-year period, the study finds that several countries are part of a group of failed and fragile states that are perpetually stuck in a “fragility trap.” These countries show little indication of lifting themselves out of their political, economic, and social malaise; they are some of the biggest recipients of Western aid dollars and, despite being resource rich in some cases, have the lowest per capita incomes in the world.
- Successful transitions out of fragility are a process of improvement in the proper sequence of authority, legitimacy and capacity through compliance with the law and incorporation of peoples into a functional economy, among other things.
- Challenges to and degradations in authority and legitimacy appear to be key reasons why countries remain stuck in a fragility trap. When it comes to sequencing countries out of fragility, donors are still uncertain on how to tie economic success to effective political development.
- At its core, effective state building involves the fundamental transformation of a broad spectrum of state-society relationships—something the donor community has historically shown to be utterly inept at addressing.
- In some cases, conflict in fragile states occurs at transitional stages when existing ideologies fail to legitimise the positions of various actors in a hierarchical social structure. Thus, the emergence of a fragility trap is due to the failure of prevailing societal values to legitimise existing divisions of labour and political order. Conversely, shifts out of fragility occur through economic and political incorporation that manifests itself in migration from rural to urban areas and engagement with remote regions through economic and communication centres.
Recommendations:
- From a donor perspective, particular attention must be paid to strategic dilemmas in terms of weighting, prioritising, and sequencing aid instruments at various junctures in the state-building process. Likewise, attention must be paid to the degree to which specific initiatives may contribute to economic development yet undermine political change. Of particular relevance are the implicit trade-offs between measures taken to achieve short-term economic growth and longer-term institutional development objectives.
- Even though a successful transition out of fragility is primarily a domestic process that involves local actors, the role of international actors, while limited, is still very important. In addition to aid, the donor community can contribute to supporting and facilitating political and institutional processes in order to strengthen the basis for resilience. However, the identification of where the investment will yield the “biggest bang for the buck” is key. More generally, aid needs to be context-specific, timed properly and strategically, and must be tied directly to indigenous capabilities that demonstrate long-term effectiveness.
