In explaining why democracies fail, experts have tended to focus on economic performance. Yet this article, published in the Journal of Democracy, analyses new data on young democracies and argues that political institutions are crucial for democratic consolidation. Institutions that place effective constraints on executive power are especially important. Donor assistance strategies should aim to help spread political and economic power more widely and must be maintained for a young democracy’s first five years.
The literature traditionally argues that a positive relationship exists between poor economic performance and democratic reversals. Yet this relationship is not borne out by the data. The data suggests that democratisation can facilitate economic reform and is not threatened by it. If sustained economic growth ultimately depends on the quality of a nation’s institutions, the industrial world’s aid programs may have the causal chain backward. What is most important however is the extent to which the benefits of economic reform are widely shared. It is important to look beyond economics and consider political institutions.
The literature frequently compares parliamentary and presidential systems, generally finding the former to be more durable. However, the data suggest that parliaments in new democracies have not done well. Rather than focus on comparing parliamentary and presidential systems, it is necessary to focus on direct measures of constraint on executive power:
- The data shows that, in cases where constraints on the executive are weak, democracy is reversed just over 70 percent of the time, and where constraints are strong, democracy is reversed only 40 percent of the time.
- It is important to assess the actual balance of power in new democracies, regardless of whether the regime type is parliamentary or presidential.
- Socioeconomic ‘initial conditions’ significantly affect the survival chances of democratic regimes. Low per capita income, high levels of inequality, high rates of poverty, and high ethnic fragmentation all harm the prospects that democracy will endure. Yet these relationships are not deterministic.
Democracy assistance must emphasize the crucial role of effective checks and balances—informal as well as formal—in building durable democratic institutions. Further policy recommendations are that:
- Foreign donors must confront problems of inequality in income and asset distribution in recipient nations. Growth alone will not necessarily promote the life chances of all the individuals in a given society, and those who are left by the wayside may lose confidence in democracy. If democracy offers any particular economic benefits, these should be measured in terms of the opportunities made available.
- The international community must support young democracies not just via aid, but also by persuading them to open their borders to trade and to join international organizations that can “lock in” the political and economic reform process. The protectionist barriers that advanced industrial countries throw up against agricultural products from the developing world are particularly counterproductive.
- As most young democracies fail during their first five years, during which leaders and institutions struggle to achieve credibility in the face of monumental challenges, these years are the crucial period during which targeted foreign-assistance strategies must be maintained.
