Service delivery
Wild, L., & Cammack, D. (2013). The supply and distribution of essential medicines in Malawi: summary findings. London: Overseas Development Institute.
This paper summarises the findings of a brief political economy analysis of the procurement, supply and distribution of essential medicines in Malawi. It uses a sectoral political economy framework that provides a more structured form of analysis, working through various stages, including identifying the nature of the problem to be addressed; diagnosing systemic features and key dynamics and incentives; and pinpointing policy options and feasible theories of change.
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Mcloughlin, C., & Harris, D. (2013). The politics of progress on water and sanitation in Colombo. London: Overseas Development Institute.
This study explores the politics of urban water supply and sanitation delivery in the city of Colombo, Sri Lanka, where improvements in coverage have been achieved within a national context characterised by almost three decades of civil war. It compares the politics of two closely related but nevertheless technically and organisationally distinct services, and examines whether and why these sectors attract different political dynamics. The broad conclusion is that pervasive features of the political economy environment can interact with sector-specific characteristics to produce particular political dynamics around the delivery of different services. Both water supply and sanitation have been able to function effectively because these political dynamics have remained relatively stable over the medium term, in spite of the wider context of civil war.
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Eaton, K., Kaiser, K., & Smoke, P. (2010). The political economy of decentralization reforms: Implications for aid effectiveness. Washington DC: World Bank.
The analytical framework presented in this report offers a systematic approach to conceptualising and examining the motives that drive politicians to transfer resources and functions to lower levels of government and lead bureaucrats to support or oppose reform throughout the implementation process. The framework aims to provide input into developing more suitable and attainable service delivery and poverty reduction objectives that take into account political and institutional obstacles and opportunities.
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Booth, D. (2009). Aiding economic growth in Africa: The political economy of roads reform in Uganda (Working Paper 307). London: Overseas Development Institute.
This report undertakes a political economy study of the changes in the roads sector as a contribution to thinking about the most suitable form and content of donor support to an ongoing reform process. The report finds a strong case for adopting a process, not blueprint, approach to programming. The relevant opportunities cannot be mapped out in detail in advance, and there will be considerable scope for learning from experience about what kinds of facilitation work best. Similarly, the investment in staff with the relevant networking and facilitation skills should be viewed as the most powerful component of any package of support, not the funding, the hardware or the conventional technical assistance.
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World Bank. (2008). The political economy of policy reform: Issues and implications for policy dialogue and development operations (Report No. 44288-GLB). Washington DC: World Bank.
How can donors improve the effectiveness of policy reform processes? This study addresses the political economy of sectoral reform in agricultural marketing, and water supply and sanitation. It uses a social analysis perspective to analyse stakeholder interests, incentives, institutions, risks and opportunities. Development agencies should undertake timely political economy analysis and establish a sustainable process for building broad coalitions. They should also promote transformative institutional change that includes empowering forms of bottom-up accountability.
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Harris, D., Wales, J., Jones, H., Rana, T., & Chitrakar, R. L. (2013). Human resources for health in Nepal – the politics of access in remote areas. London: Overseas Development Institute.
This country evidence note explores the political economy dynamics associated with attempts to ensure access to qualified human resources for health (HRH) in remote rural areas of Nepal where low ratios of skilled health personnel per head of population persist. Like other political economy studies, this paper seeks to understand the interaction of structure and agency, making connections between the way individuals and organisations behave, the decisions they make, the actions they take, and the relevant features of the context in which all of these actions take place.
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Disaster risk management
Wilkinson, E. (2012). Transforming disaster risk management: A political economy approach (ODI Background Note). London: Overseas Development Institute (ODI).
This paper examines recent work by disaster researchers on the complex role of institutional arrangements in shaping policy decisions. It identifies incentive structures, information gaps and intra-governmental relations as key factors affecting the decisions of national and local authorities. It recommends more interdisciplinary research on political processes and policy change to develop a clearer theoretical focus for Disaster Risk Management, so as to help promote the necessary institutional transformation.
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Growth
Keefer, P. (2007). Political economy. In Ghana: Meeting the challenge of accelerated and shared growth: Country economic memorandum (Vol. 3, section 4). Washington, DC: World Bank.
What hinders growth-supporting policy reform in Ghana, and how can these obstacles be addressed? In recent years, Ghana has experienced relative macroeconomic stability and growth. However, accelerating and sustaining growth requires significant policy change across a range of areas. This extract from the World Bank’s Country Economic Memorandum of Ghana examines the political incentives of policymakers to pursue such change. Clientelism undermines progress in pro-growth reforms. Reform should focus on: education; improving the collection of and access to government information; and ensuring that policy does not favour particular ethnic groups.
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Utomi, P., Duncan, A., & Williams, G. (2007). Nigeria – The political economy of reform – Strengthening incentives for economic growth. London: The Policy Practice.
How does reform take place within the constraints of political and economic processes? What has driven recent policy and institutional reforms in Nigeria, and how can Nigeria’s reform process be sustained and extended? This paper argues that the failure to achieve sustainable economic growth and poverty reduction in Nigeria is linked to institutional and incentive problems. Efforts are needed to strengthen incentives for economic growth and public accountability in Nigeria. All stakeholders must recognise the realities and risks to sustainable reform, as well as the long time-scale required.
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Extractives
Mcloughlin, C. (2013). PEA in the mining/extractives sector (GSDRC Helpdesk Research Report 1029). Birmingham: GSDRC.
This report documents a variety of case-study examples which further highlight the range of practical purposes for which PEA has been commissioned in the mining sector, how it has been undertaken in practice (i.e. methodologies), and its subsequent implications for programming. The limited available literature suggests that the particular relevance of PEA to mining is that is can help development agencies to understand: the obstacles to allocating resource rents for developmental purposes; relationships between actors, including between different levels of the state; elite incentives to generate rents, and the complex range of factors that affect their capacity to do so.
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