This chapter is a personal reflection on the peace settlement process between the government of Alfredo Cristiani and leaders of the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) to end the civil war in El Salvador. The author was a member of the FMLN until 1996 and was involved in dialogue and negotiation to end the civil war, discussions on the demilitarisation of society, and, between 1992 and 1993, was a member of a tripartite body in charge of overseeing national reconstruction, composed of representatives from the government , the UN Mission (ONUSAL), and the FMLN. Since 1997 he has conducted research on the peace process in El Salvador.
He explains that in the process the FMLN forces fully demobilized and the military dramatically reduced in numbers and submitted to processes of doctrinal reform. These matters were hinged explicitly to security sector transformation while reintegration, longer-term weapons reduction efforts and other key measures were neglected, with grave implications for human security. Reintegration failed to provide the majority of former combatants sufficient socioeconomic support to build dignified lives.
Negotiators did not address the issue of guns in civilian hands, and in fact the number of weapons in civilian possession and their use in violent crime dramatically increased after the war. Issues of institutional impunity also affected the credibility of the peace process and the prospects for national reconciliation and reparations for the victims of state and war-related violence. The overall weaknesses of reintegration efforts and the lack of provisions for reducing civilian held arms may have contributed to the substantial increase in social violence and crime in the post-war period.
