A plurality of legal and judicial institutions exist in contemporary Afghanistan, but none meet minimal definitions of the rule of law – this is a matter of consensus. In particular, formal and informal laws and mechanisms do not enforce common rules equally over both elites and the less powerful, and men/boys and women/girls. The State only has a very limited presence, especially outside Kabul, and co-exists with other forms of public or hybrid government and administration, and with power exerted by foreign military and civil organisations. In addition, violent conflict involves not only Taliban forces, other Afghan armed forces and foreign armies, but a variety of temporary or longstanding armed groups fighting, with shifting alliances and oppositions. In light of this well-documented state of affairs, the question becomes: how do partial enforcements of law and justice affect war and peace?
In short, the limited literature available shows no direct causal links from the rule of law to violent conflict or peace. It does show how various problems in law, police and justice feed into factors conducive to conflict. The ineffectiveness of formal institutions, and the capture of informal and formal mechanisms by powerful patronage networks have generated contestation and weakened dispute resolution. The formal organisation of laws, police and justice has had mixed, at times contradictory, effects. Prime examples are the militarisation of police and justice, and the arming of local militias: both have yielded security in some cases, yet they have simultaneously created problems for the rule of law and peace, such as empowering armed actors over civilians. Objects of contention related to the rule of law include the management of land and water, and women’s and girls’ rights. People’s use of insurgents’ justice mechanisms does not automatically mean unconditional support for insurgents. How legitimacy works is changing, especially as people’s expectations about law and justice rise.
