How successful has capacity development for decentralised education service delivery been in Pakistan? This article examines capacity issues in two programmes: the provincial-level Punjab Education Sector Reform Programme (PESRP) and the district-level Strategic Policy Unit (SPU) of Faisalabad City District Government. These delivered major improvements in education delivery capacity in just four years. Political leadership and national ownership of reform were key. However, the political success that ensures ownership in one regime can become the cause of downfall in the next. Political economy factors therefore remain a major impediment to devolved service delivery in Pakistan. To strengthen the political ownership of reform, a popular, well-articulated consensus on the importance of basic services to the electorate is needed.
Until 2003 Pakistan was one of the worst-performing countries in education coverage and outcomes. Analysts blame poor governance structures that weaken political and bureaucratic accountability to citizens.
However, there is also recognition of significant capacity development initiatives. These enhance the awareness and ability of citizens to articulate needs or grievances. They also develop the skills, confidence and attitudes of civil servants to respond effectively to such demands:
- The Punjab Education Sector Reform Programme (PESRP) carried out reforms including reducing teacher absenteeism and improving teacher quality, infrastructure development, support to low-cost private schools, and textbook distribution. A provincial-level implementation unit managed the programme with minimal external technical assistance (TA).
- The Strategic Policy Unit (SPU) of Faisalabad City District Government was a local government project. It introduced linked IT-based geographic information, financial and human resource management systems that enabled the tracking of development funds, and improved budgeting and staff capacity development. External TA heavily supported the SPU.
Both programmes quickly delivered major improvements in education delivery capacity, after decades of delivery stagnation and worsening education indicators. Key success factors included:
- Ownership backed by political leadership: Ministerial backing for the PERSP and the backing of Faislabad’s Mayor for the SPU gave clear messages and helped establish consensus and ownership of reforms.
- Sufficient resources, authority, and protection from political interference, especially from transfers of staff.
- Locally-oriented external TA (in the case of the SPU): The TA consultant team was locally-based, familiar with the public sector culture, and IT service providers were recruited locally (enhancing sustainability).
The cases illustrate two different approaches to capacity development for devolved education service delivery. The provincially-led PESRP abolished some newly-defined district functions: the provincial-level implementation unit (PMIU) performed them on behalf of districts. The Faislabad SPU provided continuous capacity development to a large district government. These two approaches are complementary. Despite their successes, however, the sustainability of these initiatives is in doubt. Pakistan is characterised by a volatile and polarised political environment of victimisation with little tradition of building on past successes. Policy lessons include the following:
- Political ownership is fragile unless backed by a popular, well-articulated consensus on the importance of basic services to the electorate. A vocal constituency is needed to impress on politicians that politically-expedient changes in service delivery structures or distribution of resources are unacceptable. Improvements in education service delivery that have positive impacts on the majority of service users will be a key factor in building this constituency.
- Special (protected) units such as the PMIU may be needed to protect reform against dysfunctional and opaque discretionary bureaucratic rules and processes. To be viable, such units would need to contribute broadly to capacity development, and to have good links with other government bodies.
- Capacity development is expensive and takes time. TA should be located at the level of government where capacities are to be developed, and should be accountable to decision-makers at that level. For example, the Faisalabad TA team emphasised that they were unique in the Punjab in that they were based at District level. This, they thought, gave them important insights (and credibility), which the more ‘conventional’ donor-supported TA team bases – at Provincial level – did not provide.
- Adapting to the political realities of the public sector may mean needing to avoid further devolution. For example, given Pakistan’s political constraints, donors may need to work with provincial government in rationalising education service delivery arrangements. This may involve a greater provincial role and more accountability for education planning and financing, while providing dynamic incentives to the local governments in physical infrastructure, staffing decisions, teacher development, oversight and monitoring.
