What is needed to make Public Administration Reform (PAR) succeed in Afghanistan? In this paper, the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) assesses the progress of PAR in Afghanistan and suggests ways forward. Reform has been slow and problematic but the process is critical to the country’s development. It argues that, without broader interventions from donors and the government, PAR is likely to be a costly failure, both in terms of financial resources expended and state legitimacy.
A functioning public administration is absolutely necessary to stabilisation, state-building and poverty reduction. But the success of reform efforts is mitigated by the extremely fragile and aid-dependent post-conflict environment. International experience suggests that the preconditions for successful PAR are lacking in Afghanistan. Political commitment to the reform process is weak, and the overall context is not conducive to successful reform.
The PAR process has produced a number of important achievements, including increased recruitment and capacity of the civil service through the Priority Reform and Restructuring (PPR) programme. Yet Afghanistan scores poorly on all six elements necessary for successful PAR. Inter-ministerial oversight of the programme has been very weak and some kinds of donor behaviour have damaged reform efforts.
- Donors have shown considerably less restraint than the government in maintaining discipline over salaries – there has been an over-emphasis on improved pay rather than restructuring.
- The Appointments Board of the Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission (IARCSC) remains weak – a critical bottleneck to successful public administration reform.
- No significant support has been provided to the Appeals Board.
- Much of the technical assistance involved in the PAR process has been very expensive and of poor quality.
- There has been a failure to develop an effective communications strategy to reach all levels of ministry staff as well as the wider public.
- Some of the problems encountered by the IARCSC can be attributed to uncoordinated technical assistance, with consultants giving conflicting advice to different departments.
As expected, the level of progress to date has been low. It needs to be clearly communicated that PAR is a long-term process, and that expectations should be based on realistic goals. The government and donor commitment to the IARCSC needs to be strengthened, since it is the task of the IARCSC to provide stable leadership in Afghanistan’s shifting political environment.
- Donors need to maintain long timeframes, and make long-term funding commitments. In addition, they urgently need to review and change their policies with regards to salary “top-ups”.
- A shared understanding of the role of the state and an active communications strategy need to be developed.
- Oversight of the public administration by elected representatives should be improved t national and provincial levels.
- PAR needs to be closely linked to the development of the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) and the monitoring of the Afghanistan Compact – these processes should be mutually reinforcing.
- Beneficiary demand for efficient and accountable public administration needs improvement – donors and civil society groups should work together to do this.
- Skilled international technical assistance should consist of appropriately qualified and senior professionals who are available for the medium to long term.
