How and why did a radical improvement in the security situation in two of Colombia’s three major cities, Bogotá and Medellín, come about? Is it sustainable? Why did such an improvement not occur in Colombia’s other major city, Cali, or in other areas of the country? This paper from the Crisis States Research Centre discusses the ‘metropolitan miracle’ that took place in Colombia starting in the early 1990s. It argues that the explanation for the metropolitan miracle lies in politics – in particular, coalitions, organisation and statebuilding.
The metropolitan miracle happened because, enabled by institutional reforms in 1991, new governing coalitions were able to come to power in Bogotá and Medellín. These coalitions were broad, encompassing the media, the middle class, neo-liberal technocrats and the political left. They also had strong incentives to strengthen organisations in order to solve problems of collective action and improve the functioning of the state. The miracle was far more likely to happen in big cities, since in Colombia it is only in the major cities that the middle class holds substantial power. In cities such as Bogotá, media and state organisations converge to produce a dense network of agencies that support bureaucratic practices and middle class routines.
The metropolitan miracle was enabled by institutional changes between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s which allowed new coalitions to come to power in Colombia’s cities:
- In Bogotá, independent mayors and those from the political left came to power and focused on creating an ‘urban-citizen culture’, emphasising the security dimension. The city underwent a transformation, becoming less violent and more assertive.
- In Medellín, Sergio Fajardo was elected mayor, backed by a heterogeneous coalition. He developed an urban-citizen culture programme and oversaw a steep fall in homicide rates. However, critics argue that paramilitaries have retained some power in the city.
- In Cali, the coalitions that were formed were narrow and included groups based on patronage and with links to illegal forces. Despite similar policies to those of Bogotá and Medellín, Cali experienced no miracle.
The metropolitan miracle shows that institutional reform, under the right conditions, can promote the formation of effective coalitions and bring about dramatic positive change. However, the process also involves several tough and unpleasant trade-offs, and questions remain about its sustainability:
- Socio-economic inclusion was banished from public debate by the creators of the miracle and inequality often became worse. In this sense, the new coalitions had an exclusionary character.
- The patron-client relationship was one of the only, if highly suboptimal, stable inclusionary mechanisms the Colombian polity had. The miracle dismantled this relationship but did not offer anything to replace it.
- The universal and pro-public goods stance of the coalitions created a highly inflexible way of dealing with social conflict. Poor claimants were associated with corrupt, particularistic or irresponsible agents and norms, and were systematically abused.
- Underlying structural problems, including inequality and the strength of the narco economy due to US prohibition, could destabilise the coalitions that created the miracle.
- The overwhelming national majority in support of President Uribe weakens the autonomy of mayors. This is particularly true in the area of security, where the powers of the mayor were critical to the miracle.
