What policy challenges and opportunities do donors face in seeking to strengthen the effectiveness of non-state/local justice and security networks? This paper recommends an approach of pragmatic realism that acknowledges the multi-layered pluralism of the post-colonial state and accommodates the flexibility and nuances of non-state/local networks. Donors must make a significant shift from mentoring state employees to supporting local civil society and NGOs, largely by assisting in community organisation. While fragile states require long-term statebuilding, a policy of pragmatic realism is the most viable means of reaching that goal.
The legitimacy and resilience of the post-colonial state depend on the relationships between the different layers of state and non-state authority. Western governance concepts are not easily transferable to non-state justice/security networks in post-colonial states: a justice and security state development agenda based on Western norms is often ineffective. The pragmatic realism approach recognises that both state and non-state networks deliver justice and safety services. It is supported by contemporary theories of social efficacy and capital that advocate the use of local institutions, civil society organisations and NGOs.
As fragile states do not deliver effective justice and security to most citizens, non-state/local justice and security networks are preferred. Most citizens regard official organisation as imposed and irrelevant: non-state/local security and justice networks are more trusted and legitimate. Howeve r, both state and non-state/local justice and security networks are criticised for being: unaccountable; controlled by political elites; inclined to violate human rights; and for failing to protect the rights of vulnerable groups.
Evidence suggests that non-state networks can be developed to become more accountable and amenable to protecting the rights of vulnerable groups. However, donors face numerous challenges in doing so that require local knowledge and political acumen:
- Many networks are small, providing service to a neighbourhood, within a marketplace, or along a stretch of road. Most are unknown to Western practitioners; the cost (labour and time) of identifying them is burdensome; and the likelihood of donors gaining access (physically, linguistically, and culturally) to them is low.
- Relationships between and among the networks are opaque to outsiders and their associations with the state difficult to decipher.
- Donors must juggle the needs and power concerns of numerous national stakeholders and local actors.
- Supporting non-state/local justice and security networks significantly increases the political choices and judgements which donors will have to reach, particularly with respect to armed non-state groups.
As donors lack local knowledge of post-colonial state governance structures and networks, local civil society and NGOs would be more effective in implementing non-state networks programming. However, given civil society/NGO capacity issues, donors will need to accept a higher degree of risk and unpredictability while working with them.
- Funding for justice and security networks, civil society and NGOs could be combined and small amounts provided for many recipients at the local level to initiate plentiful experiments.
- Targeting non-state justice and security network leadership can contribute to building social efficacy and capital.
- More donor staff may be required, but in time, many ought to be nationals of the partner country, thereby lowering costs.
- It is crucial to have donor staff on the ground to guarantee political leadership and a whole of government approach. To do this, different skills will be required – rather than reliance on technical expertise, staff will need negotiating skills, political acumen, and a high tolerance for uncertainty.
