How can security sector reform (SSR) become better attuned to the factors that affect the Ugandan state’s responsiveness in the security domain? This study finds that the character of decision-making and the quality of responsiveness depends on historical factors, the country’s socioeconomic set-up, its political culture and the international environment. Decision-making authority in the security domain is diffuse, different groups in society exercise their ‘demand’ for security more through informal relationships than formal mechanisms, and the state’s relationship with external actors (including donors, and regional and global powers) affects security decision-making.
‘Responsiveness’ is an aggregate of reciprocal interactions between the state and the population. It is a function of citizens’ capacity to articulate their preferences, the capability of the state to process and respond to these preferences in a timely way, the form and quality of the response, and whether it attempts to meet the demands of the diverse groups equitably.
There are two contradictory impulses in Ugandan security decision-making: 1) the concentration of power in the Presidency has resulted in the president and his closest commanders monopolising both strategic and operational decisions; and 2) the proliferation of non-state security actors, combined with weak security sector management structures, has resulted in a dispersion of decision-making authority.
- Many actors operate outside a policy framework and tend to be driven by parochial rather than state concerns.
- It is therefore difficult to ensure accountable or coherent decision-making, particularly in promoting a public security agenda. Short-term, quick-fix policy options predominate. A comprehensive policy document and systematic forecasting are lacking, and there is policy discontinuity from one part of the country to another.
- What would be normal contingencies necessarily become crises, and crises become disruptive emergencies.
- Formal mechanisms and actors are often bypassed when security policy is formulated and implemented.
What are the avenues of policy influence? The studies reveal an absence of organised interests through most phases of the policy cycle. However, individual and group demands still reach the political system at the enforcement stage (as security decision-making mainly takes place in situations of crisis). Demands are made not on behalf of a wide grouping, but in the interests of ethnic, linguistic or regional blocs, and local area notables, ethnic lobbies, traditional rulers and local community networks are prominent in mobilising and influencing the central state to respond. Thus, the localised nature of insecurity in Uganda has tended to preclude a national policy perspective.
Aid dependency, and in particular the specific set of macroeconomic policies and accompanying poverty reduction goals agreed with donors, sets the framework for all public policy decisions, including in the security domain. The overall budget framework determines what kinds of policies are possible. In the face of persisting security threats, the government has consistently sought to overcome these restrictions.
While donors have pushed for security reform in Uganda, the president has pushed to shore up the position of the security services and ensure their loyalty; external assistance cannot substitute for an internally driven process of change. External actors should therefore adopt a cautious and reflective approach. Aid in general, even if targeted at the social sectors, facilitates security policy in certain ways by freeing up government resources that might otherwise be allocated to development expenditures. Three levels of analysis are required, covering:
- The historical and structural factors that have affected the evolution of the country’s security institutions. These are key to understanding current institutional and political trajectories that will determine how much change is possible and what kind of change is desirable.
- Contemporary security institutions and the configuration of political power in the security domain. This is particularly important in Uganda, due to the formal/informal dualism that underpins institutions.
- Aid-security dynamics, in particular understanding how aid dependency and donor-government relations affect incentives for security reform. This underscores the importance of political dialogue to complement technical SSR initiatives and coherence among donors. A state-centric SSR strategy will be limited in the absence of complementary initiatives to strengthen internal ‘demand’ for security. The level of internal demand for change should be a determining factor in the nature, orientation and level of donor engagement in Uganda’s security domain.
