When and why do states disconnect their digital networks is the principle question examined in this paper. To answer this question, the authors built an event history database of 606 unique incidents involving 99 countries (1995-2011) in which a regime went beyond surveillance of particular websites or users, and disconnected Internet exchange points or blocked significant amounts of certain kinds of traffic. Comparative analysis indicates that both democratic and authoritarian regimes disable social media networks, citing concerns about national security, protecting authority figures, and preserving cultural and religious morals. Whereas democracies disable social media with the goal of protecting children, authoritarian regimes also attempt to eliminate what they perceive as propaganda.
For civil society actors around the world, digital media and online social networking applications have changed the way in which dissent is organised. In times of political uncertainty, rigged elections, or military incursions, ruling elites are sometimes willing to interfere with information infrastructure as a way of managing crises. In many of these cases, the targets are active domestic civil society movements with international linkages. Most commonly, states interfere with digital networks with the goal of protecting political authority or preserving the public good.
Key Findings:
- 52 per cent of the incidents occurred in authoritarian regimes; 39 per cent in democracies; 6 per cent in emerging democracies; and 3 percent in fragile states.
- Then we developed three standardized typologies citing concerns about national security, protecting authority figures, and preserving cultural and religious morals.
- Overall, more democracies participate in network interventions than authoritarian regimes. However, authoritarian regimes conduct shutdowns with greater frequency. After 2002, authoritarian governments began using interference as a tool of governance. In recent years, even fragile states have interfered with domestic information infrastructure, usually as a last effort at maintaining social control.
Recommendations:
- Support net neutrality by enforcing and promoting policies for equal access and non-discrimination both at home and abroad.
- Hold open conversations with U.S.-based firms that export censorship software, build kill-switches, or design user-policies that have an impact on how civic leaders organise popular democracy movements.
- Support freedom of expression, particularly by having U.S. diplomats advocate for individual journalists—or citizen journalists—who have been arrested or harassed by repressive regimes.
- Avoid using information sanctions as a policy mechanism for punishing states. Civil society actors also suffer when foreign governments impose restrictions on the flow of information.
- Invest in broad digital literacy and technology development programmes in developing countries, by supporting programmes that educate citizens that support local sustainable innovation in communities.
