What lessons can be drawn from practical experiences of the reintegration phase (R-phase) of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programmes? This paper from the Clingendael Institute maps key lessons learned and practical experiences from DDR processes, paying particular attention to reintegration. It emphasises that DDR is fundamentally political in character and should be seen as part of a broader integrated approach to reconstruction. The presence of economic alternatives is critical to the successful long-term reintegration of demobilised ex-combatants.
A clear definition of the R-phase of DDR is essential in order to manage expectations and to adjust other programmes in support of the R-phase. While the UN definition provides a useful starting point, there is a divergence between theoretical concepts and how they are implemented in practice. Furthermore, disagreement remains over what should be expected from the R-phase as part of DDR processes and what should be part of wider reconstruction programmes. Disagreement centres on whether DDR processes should take a short-term, security-focused perspective or a more developmental approach.
A number of technical issues relating to the design and management of the R-phase deserve special attention:
- Planning of the R-phase is often started too late. As a result, socio-economic context analyses, which are crucial for economic reintegration, are often inadequate or not carried out.
- While sequencing of the different phases of DDR does not need to be linear, it is still implemented as such. Preparation of the R-phase in the field can, and often must, start before disarmament and demobilisation have been completed.
- After a lack of political will, inadequate funding is one of the most serious constraints to DDR.
- Finding a balance between national leadership and responsibility and timely and effective implementation is a major policy challenge. Taking the political environment in which DDR takes place into account is crucial, yet often ignored.
- A chain approach to implementation can save time and resources, but may have negative effects, including exclusion of local actors, which can hinder local capacity-building.
- There is a systematic lack of evaluation and monitoring of the impact, as opposed to the achievements, of reintegration programmes. Quantitative measures of outputs may not provide a robust measure of programme performance or impact.
Policy considerations relating to the implementation of the R-phase of DDR programmes include the following:
- There is no generally applicable definition of an ex-combatant. Where criteria do exist, implementation remains a challenge. Programmes often have not taken account of the relationship between ex-combatants and communities.
- Urban and rural programmes require different approaches. Reintegration in urban areas often faces a tight labour market, while rural programmes face the discrepancy between ex-combatant expectations and actual opportunities.
- Training often does not match local market requirements and opportunities or ex-combatant expectations.
- The economic context into which ex-combatants are reintegrated is a constraining factor for DDR programmes. Employment opportunities for ex-combatants are crucial to reintegration.
- Expert opinion differs on the effectiveness of cash payments for reinsertion. There should be a difference between cash payments for reinsertion and those for longer-term reintegration.
- Implementation of programmes relies heavily on NGOs, with aid agencies often subcontracting work to them. However, NGOs also tend to replicate and propagate systemic flaws. The limited capacity of local NGOs is also a constraining factor.
