When designing CBMs, lessons include:
- Link CBMs to wider peace- and state-building processes or negotiations; locally design CBMs according to local context; use CBMs in situations where trust is low; start CBMs in non-controversial, or symbolic, issue areas; design CBMs with long-term, incremental approaches; combine several CBMs at different track levels, and in different sectors.
When mediating the design of confidence building measures (CBMs), lessons include:
- CBM beneficiaries should be diverse and not always the same people; keep CBMs simple, low-cost, easy to control, monitor and verify; make the impacts visible to the target audience; clarify the consequences for violating the conditions of the CBMs; apply culturally sensitive CBMs in several sectors; CBMs should build confidence, but not determine future steps of wider negotiations; and they should have an equal impact on all parties.
The roles for international actors in CBMs include:
- Funding, technical and logistical support in designing CBMs; capacity building; political/diplomatic support; implementation; and monitoring and verification.
When implementing CBMs, lessons include:
- CBMs are easier to apply where there are already channels of communication between the parties; perceived and real security threats to beneficiaries should be examined; CBMs may be undermined by spoilers, that do not want an end to hostilities; avoid vague and unrealistic CBMs; be wary of CBMs that strengthen the status quo; the closer CBMs come to politics the more likely it is that the actors, and the CBM process, will become politicised; flexible CBMs are necessary – especially if they occur around or during peace talks; deciding when and how to approach the parties to set up a CBM is highly sensitive; including CBMs in public policy can increase support and legitimise a process; understand the risks of unilateral and asymmetrical CBMs.
When verifying and monitoring CBMs, lessons include:
- Verification and monitoring systems are CBMs in themselves, and essential elements to verify and monitor CBMs; they can generate mutual understandings, expectations, and confidence in the process; and in conflict situations, it is common that one side reneges on CBM commitments – which is often counterproductive and can undermine the limited confidence that existed.
