An understanding of context is essential to stabilisation interventions: what is required to stabilise one area depends on what existed before the conflict and also the degree of damage inflicted by the conflict (Dennys, 2013). While the aim of stabilisation interventions should be to provide a foundation for longer-term social, economic and political evolution, Dennys (2013) asserts that this does not need to be geared toward a free-market economy and democratic institutions as these processes are themselves destabilising. Forming states through stabilisation is not necessarily a benign process but one that can involve the violent imposition of a particular political order, based on frameworks developed by the international community. In such instances, the mere presence of the international community can be destabilising (Dennys & Fitz-Gerald, 2011). It can be particularly challenging to achieve conflict sensitivity and implement the principles of the New Deal for Engagement Fragile States in stabilisation contexts where aid actors can themselves be conflict actors.
Donors should acknowledge that aid can be instrumentalised in stabilisation contexts for political purposes (eg to ‘win the hearts and minds’ of local populations, to build state legitimacy and to set the stage for a particular political order) and that they themselves can be seen as a political and/or conflict actor. Azarbaijani-Moghaddam et al. (2008) find in their study of Afghani perceptions of civil-military relations that many Afghanis see the development-security nexus as political and contrived – and favour multi-year long term sustainable development projects over quick impact projects.
Fishstein and Wilder (2012) find that international stabilisation projects can have negative outcomes and destabilising effects. In Afghanistan, this includes charges of extensive corruption and uneven geographic distribution that have delegitimised the government; competition over aid resources; and perverse incentives to maintain an insecure environment as the bulk of assistance funds have been spent in insurgency-affected provinces. In addition, most interventions are focused on socio-economic issues, failing to address the drivers of conflict which are related to governance.
Key texts
Dennys, C. (2013). For Stabilization. Stability: International Journal of Security and Development, 2(1), 1-14.
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Fishstein, P. & Wilder, A. (2012). Winning hearts and minds? Examining the relationship between aid and security in Afghanistan. Somerville, MA: Tufts, Feinstein International Centre
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Additional resources
Azarbaijani-Moghaddam S., Wardak, M., & Zaman, I., & Taylor. A. (2008). Afghan hearts, Afghan minds: Exploring Afghan perceptions of civil-military relations (Research conducted for the European Network of NGOs in Afghanistan (ENNA) and the British and Irish Agencies Afghanistan Group (BAAG)). London: BAAG.
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Dennys, C. & Fitz-Gerald, A. M. (2011). Intervention hangovers in stabilisation operations. Case studies from Afghanistan and Iraq. København: Danish Institute for International Studies
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