A number of aspects of the political economy in a country can affect disaster resilience. One of them is the regulatory environment, particularly in relation to urban building codes and land use: poor regulations, or poor enforcement of regulations, can create economic and social conditions that put vulnerable groups at greater risks and that are difficult to correct (GFDRR, 2010; Turnbull et al., 2013; Wilkinson, 2012a).
For example, poor people’s frequent insecurity of land holdings is a disincentive to build well (GFDRR, 2010, p. 15). At the same time, the poor may resist regulation if it threatens to evict them from their settlement without a relocation that provides similar access to job markets and services (Wilkinson, 2012a, p. 4). Conversely, effective government policies for the security of property (clear titles) can, in some cases, allow the poor to invest in prevention: in Peru, the distribution of 1.2 million land titles in 1996 was associated with a 68% increase in housing renovation within four years (GFDRR, 2010, pp. 6, 15).
Another significant issue, documented in some case studies, is how corruption and patronage systems constrain adaptive capacities and undermine disaster resilience. One study in Bangladesh found that both pre- and post- disaster interventions were co-opted and used to enhance the assets of elites to the detriment of lower-income groups (Mahmud & Prowse, 2012). Based on a survey of 278 households in Khulna, the study found that 99% of households had experienced corruption related to DRR interventions before and after Cyclone Alia in May 2009. Pre-disaster interventions (e.g. disaster preparedness training) were undermined by negligence and nepotism, which included trainees being selected on the basis of political considerations. Post-disaster interventions (e.g. public works programmes) were affected by wage/asset stripping, bribery and the misuse of resources, including corrupt tendering practices. These effects were not uniformly felt across wealth quartiles, however: ultra-poor households experienced more corruption in pre-disaster interventions, whilst the wealthiest quartile experienced corruption in post-disaster interventions (Mahmud & Prowse, 2012).
Anthropological studies have explored how and why patronage systems can be resilient and capable of reproducing the vulnerabilities of less powerful groups over the long term. These political dynamics can limit agency and hinder adaptive capacities.
Praying for Drought: Persistent Vulnerability and the Politics of Patronage in Ceara, Northeast Brazil
This study examines the underlying causes of persistent vulnerability to drought in one area of Northeast Brazil. It argues that in spite of the construction of dams, cloud-seeding airplanes, massive relief programmes and sophisticated climate-forecasting systems, the basic underlying vulnerabilities of the rural population have remain unchanged for decades. This persistent vulnerability is attributed to embedded patron-client relationships, which limit the choice and agency of the rural poor:
- In this highly precarious drought-prone rural environment, unequal patron-client relations are a key survival strategy for farming communities. People in these communities rely on patrons to give them land and protection during times of drought, in return for labour.
- Other factors underlying people’s persistent vulnerability include: historical inequity in resource distribution, the lack of quality education and health care, insufficient water systems, inadequate investment in physical infrastructure (energy, roads, etc.), and the absence of climate-neutral employment (i.e., manufacturing).
- In this context of structural inequality, government responses to drought (in the form of food aid, water, and cash-for-work programmes) have become the only ‘adaptive capacity’ available to rural communities vulnerable to environmental stress. This cycle of disaster and relief in turn reinforces the paternalistic relationship between central state institutions and the powerless rural population.
Source: Nelson and Finan, 2009
In many developing countries, public policies and political commitment to disaster resilience has been sub-optimal. In a meta-review of the evidence, Wilkinson (2012a) attributes this to:
- Lack of interest and political will: The political salience of DRM is low, because citizens cannot easily observe its effects. Its benefits are also more likely to be under-estimated where experience with hazards is absent. Even in areas of recent disaster, other problems may take precedence, such as reconstruction. High-impact disasters open up ‘policy windows’, but the focus is usually on relief. Governments may also fail to invest because they know external aid will be given after a disaster.
- Complex economic and political incentives: Resilience depends on public funding because it is a form of public good (Jha et al., 2013, p. 3). There are trade-offs in public investment decisions, as governments distribute funds according to need and other demands, including economic growth. The lack of resources in poor countries partly explains insufficient DRM.
- Information gaps: Disaster risk policy options are complex, and their relative effectiveness uncertain. This undermines political commitment to them.
- Coordination problems: Relationships between different levels of government are key, yet there are often coordination problems (particularly how horizontal and vertical power is distributed, formally and informally, and how local governance works). Local governments may be relatively powerless, lack clear mandates, and have strong incentives to respond to the needs of local elites.
- GFDRR. (2010). Natural Hazards, UnNatural Disasters. The Economics of Effective Prevention. United Nations, World Bank.
See document online - Jha, A.K., et al. (eds.) (2013). Building Urban Resilience: Principles, Tools, and Practice. World Bank.
See document online - Mahmud, T & Prowse, M. (2012). Corruption in cyclone preparedness and relief efforts in coastal Bangladesh: Lessons for climate adaptation? Global Environmental Change, 22(4), 933–943.
See document online - Nelson, D. R., & Finan, T. (2009). Praying for drought: Persistent Vulnerability and the Politics of Patronage in Ceará, Northeast Brazil. American Anthropologist, 111(3), 302–316.
See document online - Turnbull, M., et al. (2013). Toward Resilience: A Guide to Disaster Risk Reduction and Climate Change Adaptation. Catholic Relief Services.
See document online - Wilkinson, E. (2012a). Transforming disaster risk management: a political economy approach. ODI.
See document online