Footprint dilemmas
Paris and Sisk (2007, p. 5) explain that the level of intrusiveness of external actors is affected by: the size of the international presence (e.g. number of people, budget); the scope of tasks undertaken; and assertiveness in pursuing the tasks.
More versus less. Some reforms may require a large number of people to manage and a security presence to oversee – e.g. reform of the security sector, or overseeing a peace process. On the other hand, local actors and practices may be crowded out by such a large presence, which could delegitimise the reforms, or lead to changes that do not reflect national needs or values.
Box 10: Delivering services versus building national capacity in South Sudan
In case study analysis of 16 Multi-Donor Trust Funds (MDTFs), Commins et al. (2013) acknowledge a trade-off between delivering services quickly and efficiently and building national capacity. They suggest using separate aid instruments (even two MDTFs) to perform each task to avoid conflict between objectives. In Southern Sudan, for example, the Capacity Building Trust Fund and the Basic Services Fund were more effective than the MDTF-SS, which tried to do both tasks simultaneously.
Source: Commins, Davies, Gordon, Hodson, Hughes & Lister (2013).
Duration dilemmas
Long-term versus short-term engagement. Statebuilding and peacebuilding are long-term processes, but a long-term presence of external actors can foster disillusionment, hostility, or passivity within the host country (Paris & Sisk, 2007). Additionally, donor countries are often not willing to commit the resources for a long-term engagement, despite frequently not having an exit or transition strategy (Commins et al., 2013). Therefore, while the goals may be long-term, the tools may only be available in the short or medium term.
Too much, too soon. The WDR 2011 notes that a reform process that is ‘too slow’ prolongs vulnerability to violence (World Bank, 2011b, p. 139). However, it also notes that ‘lessons from the history of institutional transformation provide cautionary evidence that going “too fast” creates other risks of backlash. Countries that have addressed violence have sequenced reforms, frequently over a generational time period, to develop social consensus, and to allow their societies to absorb change and to develop their institutional capacities’ (World Bank, 2011b).
Quick wins versus slow reforms. Reforms which lead to quick and visible benefits (known as ‘quick wins’ or ‘peace dividends’) are considered to be a way to foster confidence in, and the legitimacy of, the statebuilding and peacebuilding process. Service delivery is sometimes prioritised for this purpose. With limited resources, there is tension between focusing on short-term gains, to the detriment of longer-term reforms (e.g. security sector reform), which may take a long time to show results and may be harder to achieve. Therefore, in terms of sequencing, it is important to prioritise the delivery of visible state recovery, while simultaneously planning for the longer-term change required to build peace (see Box 10).
Speed versus quality. When need is great, actors can be incentivised to act fast and enact deep and broadly changing interventions – but the WDR 2011 identifies the scope and speed of reforms as risk factors (World Bank, 2011b, p. 145). Fast, broad reform initiatives can lead to: overuse and exhaustion of capacity; the transplantation of lessons not appropriate to needs and context; the setting up of parallel systems rather than using (and potentially strengthening) state systems; a focus on outputs rather than outcomes; lower quality or unsustainable reforms; and the exclusion of stakeholders in the decision making processes (World Bank, 2011b).
Participation dilemmas
Who to engage with? Who to listen to? National or factional leaders are not necessarily representative of the people or interests within a country – yet these people are often those making statebuilding and peacebuilding priority decisions (Paris & Sisk, 2007). Key dilemmas include: engaging spoilers in the processes; including other stakeholders; ensuring people and groups are represented in new power structures; not pushing externally-defined objectives (Paris & Sisk, 2007). Decisions about who to engage with, and who to listen to, are further complicated if external actors lack understanding of national, regional and local power dynamics. Other dilemmas include how to balance local versus national needs and demands, or those of the centre versus those of the periphery; and how to hear and understand what people really mean (Anderson, Brown & Jean, 2012).
Inclusion versus non-inclusion. Inequalities, discrimination, exclusion and the denial of human rights are often directly related to state fragility and conflict (DFID, 2010b). A dilemma for donors is whether and how to design inclusive statebuilding and peacebuilding processes that address inequalities, which may not be considered a priority by domestic actors. Some view a rights-based approach to programming as crucial in the achievement of long term and sustainable empowerment of marginalised groups. For example, gender is rarely built in as a cross-cutting issue from the beginning of a reform process – particularly as it is often not identified as a priority, and not considered fundamental to fostering survival state functions. As a result, donors and governments miss opportunities to promote gender equality within political, social, economic and institutional change processes (Castillejo, 2011).
State/formal versus non-state/informal. In FCAS, informal non-state actors fulfil functions that formal state actors fulfil in other countries – e.g. in the economic or justice sectors. A dilemma for donors is whether and how to engage and/or use informal systems, which may not always align with their values (see Boxes 1 and 7).
Dependency dilemmas
Sustained international presence and funds in a country can create a host country dependence on international actors. The underlying dilemma here is linked to the contradictions of externally-assisted (or driven) statebuilding and peacebuilding (see Core concepts) (Paris & Sisk, 2007).
Coherence dilemmas
Paris and Sisk (2007, p.6) identify two types of coherence dilemmas. ‘Organisational coherence’ highlights the difficulty of coordinating the many different actors’ objectives, policies and funds in a country. ‘Normative coherence’ dilemmas arise where the values of external actors (e.g. self-determination, democratic accountability, gender rights) are not fully shared by domestic actors (Paris & Sisk, 2007).
Need versus capacity. The key message of the WDR 1997 is that states should match their policy ambitions and practices to their capacity (World Bank, 1997). However, Thomas (2012) notes that many governments have adopted unaffordable policies and institutions, sometimes encouraged and (often) funded by donors.
Box 11: Dilemmas facing the UK aid programme in Afghanistan
Thompson (2012) evaluates Afghan perceptions of UK aid, drawing on interviews and workshops with 100 people in Afghanistan during 2011. The paper identifies the following key dilemmas facing the UK Government’s aid programme:
- Prioritise security or poverty reduction? What about human rights?
- Focus on the poorest or on the ones who will indirectly support the poor?
- Focus on business or the government?
- Fund projects that are able to be monitored?
- Who do you listen to?
- How do you listen?
- More aid money on-budget, or off-budget?
- Aim for short-term results or invest in the long-term?
- Build on what’s there or start with a blank slate?
- Centralise governance and impose systems or build from the bottom-up?
- More or less money on aid in the future?
The paper identifies thematic trade-offs: cultural sensitivities, sustainability, monitoring, inclusion of Afghan voices, engagement with the Afghan Government, and the approach to informal systems.
Source: Thompson (2012)
- Anderson, Brown, & Jean. (2012). Time to Listen: Hearing People on the Receiving End of International Aid. CDA.
See document online - Castillejo, C. (2011). Building a State that Works for Women: Integrating Gender into Post-Conflict State Building. Madrid: FRIDE.
See document online - Commins, S., Davies, F., Gordon, A., Hodson, E., Hughes, J., & Lister, S. (2013). Pooled Funding to Support Service Delivery Lessons of Experience from Fragile and Conflict-Affected States. London: DFID.
See document online - DFID. (2010b). Working Effectively in Conflict-affected and Fragile Situations: Briefing Paper D: Promoting Non-discrimination. London: DFID
See document online - Paris, R. & Sisk, T. (2007). Managing Contradictions: The Inherent Dilemmas of Postwar Statebuilding (Research Partnership on Postwar Statebuilding). New York: International Peace Academy.
See document online - Thomas, M. A. (2012). Rich Donors, Poor Countries. Policy Review, 175.
See document online - Thompson. E. A. (2012). Losing the Ability to Dream. Afghan Perceptions of UK Aid. British & Irish Agencies Afghanistan Group.
See document online - World Bank. (1997). World development report 1997: the state in a changing world. Oxford University Press. See document online
- World Bank. (2011b). World Development Report 2011. Washington, DC: World Bank.
See document online