Security, justice and the rule of law are survival functions of the state, and frequently considered prerequisites for economic and social development (World Bank, 2011b; Meagher, 2011; Timilsina, 2007). Restoring or building a minimum level of security is often a priority for international support to FCAS, but actors’ understandings of security vary significantly. Typical areas for reform include: security sector reform; constitutional and legal reform; legal aid and assistance; transitional justice mechanisms; and addressing corruption.
Box 5: Case study: Sierra Leone – security first, service delivery later
From 2001, DFID was the dominant donor in post-conflict Sierra Leone and played ‘the key role in defining political priorities for the country’ (LSE & PwC, 2009, p.7). From 2001 to 2005 DFID interventions prioritised the survival functions of the state, particularly basic security (under a short-term stabilisation initiative) and rule of law (Chapman & Vaillant, 2010). The focus was on building key state capacities. Progress in these functions was seen to be a precondition for interventions and progress in other functions, and essential to sustain peace. These decisions were informed by political economy and conflict analysis (DFID, 2010a).
DFID viewed expected functions as secondary reform areas that would receive attention from other donors (DFID, 2010a). However, it was later discovered that other donors had not provided support to service delivery as expected, and a DFID Country Programme Evaluation highlighted it as a new priority area that DFID should address (DFID, 2010a). DFID interventions after 2005 targeted pro-poor service delivery and economic growth promotion (DFID, 2010a). This highlights the need for effective donor coordination and division of labour.
Sources: DFID (2010a); LSE & PWC (2009)
Key challenges, trade-offs and relationship with other state functions
Policymakers are acutely interested in the degree to which security can be achieved without sacrificing justice and human rights. FCAS are often characterised by a critical lack of security and justice and, in many cases, the state itself is the primary perpetrator of violence and insecurity. Coordination across justice agencies is important to reduce impunity (World Bank, 2011b). A comprehensive approach – combining security and justice sector reforms (military, police, judicial and penal systems) – has increased in popularity since the 1990s (e.g. see Box 6) (Denney, 2013; Timilsina, 2007).
Box 6: Case study – Sequencing between security/policing and justice reforms in Haiti
Case study analysis of statebuilding in Haiti in the 1990s and 2000s (Timilsina, 2007) identifies that police reforms were undermined as they were not enacted with reforms in related judicial and penal sectors. This contributed to reduced general security in the country. Problems with the justice system meant insufficient prosecution of criminals. Also, the inability of courts to settle land and property disputes meant that these disputes were increasingly resolved through violence. Timilsina (2007) argues this occurred because early reconstruction activities focused too much on the military and police, without taking a comprehensive approach that included judicial and penal reform.
Source: Timilsina (2007)
Many FCAS have laws that discriminate against the poor and violate international human rights standards. They may also be outdated and therefore lack certain provisions that are key to protecting the safety and security of the population (e.g. definitions of organised crime or people trafficking; witness protection provisions). In many instances, small-scale law reforms have been done in the interim period after conflict, pending broader reforms that significantly amend the entire legal framework – from criminal law to civil law to public administration law. International IDEA (2011) warns that external support to constitution building can be both constructive and problematic, and calls for a restrained approach where external actors engage only when specifically asked to.
Limited access to basic justice services is a key problem in FCAS. Formal legal aid schemes are often established in FCAS, but are limited by the lack of lawyers in the country and may not be affordable. Maru (2006) suggests they should be supplemented by initiatives involving civil society (e.g. in ‘paralegal aid schemes’ non-lawyers provide advice even though they cannot represent clients in court).
Informal systems of security and justice often exist alongside, or instead of, formal systems. They can facilitate participation and access to justice for those who are excluded from formal systems; they are familiar to local populations; and can be quick and convenient. Such systems can also be problematic, however, as they can be discriminatory against certain groups – in particular, women or those not from the locality. In addition, there may be little oversight or referral to judicial and other formal institutions. Donors’ generally ‘state-centric approach’ to statebuilding and peacebuilding means they often find it challenging to engage with informal actors (see Box 7) (Denney, 2013; Thompson, 2011).
Box 7: Case study – Ignoring informal institutions in Sierra Leone
Drawing on interviews from across three provinces of Sierra Leone, Denney (2013) found that after 15 years of security and justice reform in Sierra Leone, DFID still overwhelmingly focuses on state systems. This is despite the fact that the majority of the population access security and justice through informal means. The book notes that by not engaging with informal actors, DFID’s activities have had only a limited impact on the quality of security and justice provided, and have not addressed one of the contributing causes of the war.
Source: Denney (2013)
- See also GSDRC Topic Guide on Safety, Security and Justice.
- See GSDRC Topic Guide on Fragile States.
- See GSDRC Topic Guide on Justice.
- See GSDRC Topic Guide on Justice.
- Chapman, N. & Vaillant, C. (2010). Synthesis of country programme evaluations conducted in fragile states (DFID funded evaluation report ev709). ITAD.
See document online - Denney, L. (2013). Justice and Security Reform: Development agencies and informal institutions in Sierra Leone. Routledge.
See document online - DFID. (2010a). Building Peaceful States and Societies: A DFID Practice Paper. London: DFID
See document online - International IDEA. (2011). Constitution Building After Conflict: External Support to a Sovereign Process (Policy Paper). Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance.
See document online - London School of Economics (LSE) and PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP (PWC). (2009). Statebuilding in fragile situations – How can donors ‘do no harm’ and maximise their positive impact? Country case study – Sierra Leone (Joint study prepared for the OECD DAC). Paris: OECD.
See document online - Maru, V. (2006). Between Law and Society: Paralegals and the Provision of Primary Justice Services in Sierra Leone and Worldwide. New York: Open Society Institute. See document online
- Meagher, P. (2011). Statebuilding in fragile and post-conflict situations: a literature review. The Urban Institute and the World Bank/PRMPS. Unpublished.
- Thompson, E. A. (2011). Trust is the Coin of the Realm. Lessons from the Money Men in Afghanistan. Oxford University Press.
- Timilsina, A. R. (2007). Getting the Policies Right: The Prioritization and Sequencing of Policies in Post?conflict Countries (Unpublised dissertation). Pardee RAND Graduate School.
See document online - World Bank. (2011b). World Development Report 2011. Washington, DC: World Bank.
See document online