All governments face tough decisions when deciding what reforms to prioritise, and in what sequence to carry them out. These challenges are even more acute in FCAS when everything is urgent and important, and when capacity and resources are low. Decisions about sequencing reforms make up an important part of a wider process of prioritisation. These decisions are made as part of a strategic planning process (when expected results, timeframes, strategies and resources are identified), and also during the subsequent period of implementation (Center on International Cooperation (CIC), 2011).
Prioritisation and sequencing choices can be analysed thematically (what sector to focus on), geographically (what country/region to focus on), and by actor (what actor to focus on). This Topic Guide concentrates on the issues and challenges surrounding sequencing decisions made thematically.
There is disagreement on definitions of state fragility, on the countries considered fragile, and on the relevant data to use to measure fragility. Most development agencies conceptualise fragility as a failure of the state to perform functions necessary to meet citizens’ basic needs and expectations. The OECD-DAC (2007, p.2) definition is: ‘states are fragile when state structures lack political will and/or capacity to provide the basic functions needed for poverty reduction, development and to safeguard the security and human rights of their populations’. DFID’s list of fragile states is based on three different indices—the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA), the Failed States Index of the Fund for Peace, and the Uppsala Conflict Database (International Development Committee, 2011).
FCAS are often considered as the opposite of a resilient state (OECD, 2008). FCAS face challenges that differ in degree, and some argue in kind, to the challenges faced by other developing countries. Among other factors, FCAS are characterised as high-risk environments that have complex political economies and state-society relations, weak (or non-existent) national and local capacities and formal institutions, and internal and external stresses that heighten the risk of violent conflict and instability (e.g. OECD, 2012). These challenges suggest that different policy responses and reforms are needed in FCAS, compared to other developing countries.
FCAS are home to an estimated 1.5 billion people, and an increasing proportion of the world’s poor. They are the countries that are furthest from achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and they receive around 30% of Official Development Assistance.
Statebuilding and peacebuilding models conceptualise FCAS according to the fulfilment (or not) of ‘survival’ and ‘expected’ functions of the state (see Box 3), and the effects of different dimensions of statehood (or their absence) on peace and stability (Grävingholt, Ziaja & Kreibaum, 2012). While the terms are contested, the literature (e.g. Carment, Samy & Landry, 2013; UNDP, 2012; World Bank, 2012a) asserts that to be effective and resilient to crises, a state must develop or rebuild the following:
- Capacity to secure the safety and wellbeing of its population
- Legitimacy so that citizens accept the state’s basic right to rule over them
- Authority over its citizens and territory (i.e. monopoly on the legitimate use of force and the ability of the laws of the state to supersede other loyalties).
A peacebuilding and statebuilding approach is a long-term process of rebuilding state-society relations whereby improvements to accountability, transparency and oversight mechanisms strengthen the underlying contract between the citizen and the state. This long-term vision underpins sequencing and prioritisation decisions.
Statebuilding and peacebuilding have become the central objectives of international assistance to FCAS. Practitioners and academics often used to separate statebuilding from peacebuilding objectives and reforms. However, actors increasingly identify the need to have one integrated approach (e.g. DFID, 2010a). The g7+’s New Deal proposes five core Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals: legitimate politics (inclusive political settlements and conflict resolution); security; justice; economic foundations (employment and livelihoods); and revenues and services.
Why does sequencing in FCAS matter?
FCAS often have significant state- and peace (re)building needs, and low capacity and resources to address these needs. A prioritisation and sequencing of reforms is necessary as not all reforms can be carried out at once.
The literature widely claims that prioritisation and sequencing have significant implications for fragility, resilience, conflict and development outcomes in a country. It suggests that planned prioritisation and sequencing can support better:
- focus and timing of state-(re)building reforms
- management of competing demands
- understanding of needs, development trajectories, key actors and institutions, and pathways to exit fragility (see Box 1)
- agreements on common goals, roles and division of labour
- value for money
- understanding of risk.
Box 1: Case study – Missed opportunities through misdiagnosis of role of local actors in Afghanistan
Informal money service providers (hawaladars) have historically been an important informal institution and key economic agents in Afghanistan. They fully replaced the formal banking system during decades of conflicts, and especially under the Taliban, and provided the only facility to transfer money in and out of the country. Donors’ difficulty in engaging with informal economy actors meant that they did not understand the importance of the hawala (the informal banking system) and, in fact, sought to disband it. This led to missed opportunities in engaging with people central to building peace and restoring normalcy post-conflict.
What is the state of the evidence?
In spite of the potential benefits of improving the prioritisation and sequencing of statebuilding and peacebuilding reforms, there is little evidence on how this has been done, the sequence followed, or its effects on outcomes. Most of the literature is qualitative, theoretical, and policy oriented, with the majority of texts published (or funded) by donors. While almost all of the literature asserts that sequencing is important, there is little evidence to support this assertion. Most texts recommend a context specific sequence be developed, so the literature increasingly focuses on the process of prioritisation and sequencing (see Frameworks, tools and aid instruments).
Sequencing is acknowledged as a significant research gap, and as receiving inadequate attention from development agencies (Grindle, 2005; McLean Hilker, Garrasi & Griffith, 2008). Analysis of the impact of choosing one sequence of reforms over another in FCAS is complicated by the multitude of actors involved and of factors that make it difficult to attribute influence, such asthe lack of a counterfactual. While monitoring and evaluation might be expected to provide information on sequencing, it is often the ‘weakest link’ in strategic planning in FCAS, according to CIC (2011, p.4).
The literature that is available on sequencing is fragmented, as sequencing itself is rarely the focus of research. Further, ‘sequencing’ is interpreted in different ways, to mean either (a) the sequence of state-(re)building reforms enacted by the government or other actors; and/or (b) how a state has developed (i.e. analysis of the actual sequence in which a state has developed). This report focuses on (a) the sequence of state-(re)building reforms, particularly on those supported by donors.
- See the GSDRC Topic Guide on Fragile States.
- See http://www.g7plus.org/new-deal-document/ and http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2013/05/01/twenty-fragile-states-make-progress-on-millennium-development-goals.
- See http://www.g7plus.org/new-deal-document/.
- It is outside of the scope of this topic guide to explore the extensive academic and practitioner literature that evaluates and contests these terms. For a critique see Grimm, Lemay-Hébert and Nay (2014).
- Four general sources of state legitimacy have been identified by Bellina, Darbon, Eiksen and Sending (2009, p.15): (1) input legitimacy (how the state functions); (2) output legitimacy (what the state does); (3) shared beliefs (the beliefs people have about the state); and (4) international legitimacy.
- The g7+ is an association of countries that are, or have been, affected by conflict. It aims to share experiences and advocate for reforms to international community engagement.
- See http://www.g7plus.org/new-deal-document/.
- Carment, D., Samy, Y., & Landry, J. (2013). Transitioning Fragile States: A Sequencing Approach. The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, 37(2), 125-151.
See document online - Center on International Cooperation. (2011). Strategic Planning in Fragile and Conflict Contexts. New York: CIC, New York University.
See document online - DFID. (2010a). Building Peaceful States and Societies: A DFID Practice Paper. London: DFID
See document online - Grävingholt, J., Ziaja, S., & Kreibaum, M. (2012). State fragility: towards a multi-dimensional empirical typology. Bonn: Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik.
See document online - Grindle. M. (2005). Good Enough Governance Revisited (A Report for DFID with reference to the Governance Target Strategy Paper, 2001).
See document online - International Development Committee. (2011). Working Effectively in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States: DRC and Rwanda (International Development Committee – Twelfth Report). London: UK Parliament.
See document online - McLean Hilker, L., Garrasi, D. & Griffith, L. with Purdekova, A. & Clarke, J. (2008). Scoping a long-term research programme on conflict, state fragility and social cohesion (Report prepared for DFID).
See document online - OECD-DAC. (2007). Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations. Paris: OECD.
See document online - OECD. (2008). Concepts and Dilemmas of State Building in Fragile Situations. From Fragility to Resilience. Paris: OECD.
See document online - OECD. (2012a). Evaluating Peacebuilding Activities in Settings of Conflict and Fragility Improving Learning for Results. Paris: OECD-DAC.
See document online - Thompson, E. A. (2006). The nexus of drug trafficking and hawala in Afghanistan. In Buddenberg, D. & Byrd, W. A., Afghanistan’s Drug Industry: Structure, Functioning, Dynamics, and Implications for Counter-Narcotics Policy, pp. 155-188. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and World Bank.
See document online - Thompson, E. A. (2011). Trust is the Coin of the Realm. Lessons from the Money Men in Afghanistan. Oxford University Press.
- UNDP. (2012). Governance measurements for conflict and fragility: a comparative inventory. UNDP.
See document online - World Bank. (2012a). Guidance for Supporting Statebuilding in Fragile and Conflict- Affected States: A Tool-Kit. Washington, DC: World Bank.
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