How do politicians operating on an election cycle interact with career bureaucrats? This working paper, published by Harvard Business School, argues that politicians can exert harmful pressures on career civil servants, despite constitutional protections. Analysis of data from the Indian Administrative Service (IAS) identifies two types of inefficiency. Political influence undermines merit-based advancement in the civil service, discouraging junior bureaucrats from developing their skills. Donor funding channelled through bureaucracies may increase the value of officer loyalty to politicians, with negative long term consequences for bureaucratic competence.
The dataset for this study follows the entire career histories of bureaucrats in the IAS. In the Indian context, as elsewhere, politicians generally lack the authority to recruit, lay off, demote or influence the wages of appointed civil servants. On the other hand, choices about what tasks to delegate to which officers do have a political component–and bureaucrats respond to such delegation. The theoretical framework employed correctly predicts two separate paths to success for Indian civil servants, one merit-based and the other centred on political loyalty.
Transfers of bureaucrats increased markedly in the period when a new Chief Minister assumes office, despite countervailing constitutional provisions. This impact was much more pronounced in the 1990s than in the 1980s. A possible explanation is the entrance of several regional parties, representing under-privileged groups, into the political scene after 1989. Other findings from a quantitative analysis of the IAS data include:
- Officers of a higher skill level are 50 per cent less likely to be transferred with the advent of a new elected official. On the other hand, civil servants employed in their home state are much more likely to face reassignment.
- Highly-skilled bureaucrats are more likely to follow even and stable career paths. They experience many fewer transfers between posts of dissimilar importance and somewhat fewer transfers between posts of similar importance.
- Bureaucrats displaying greater initial ability typically take on extended training, particularly abroad, since they are making an investment in developing expertise. In a typical pattern, such officers will be recommended for senior positions in the central government two decades into their careers.
- “Loyal” officers experience similar overall career success to “highly-skilled” officers. Bureaucrats of the same caste as the Chief Minister’s party base boosted their chances of filling an important post by 7 per cent.
- The basic framework sketched here can be extended, within limits, to district-level civil service transfers and outcomes.
Aid agencies should consider that increasing the funds channelled through bureaucracies may increase the value of officer loyalty to politicians, with negative long term consequences for bureaucratic competence. Other implications include the following:
- It is advisable to limit by law the power of politicians to transfer bureaucrats too frequently, as proposed in a recent Public Services Bill. Government should seek other ways to reduce the influence of rent-seeking on bureaucratic efficiency.
- Constraining politicians’ ability to fill their ranks with loyalists may encourage junior bureaucrats to develop their expertise.
- A review process forcing politicians to justify certain appointment choices might curtail the misuse of reassignment.
