What are the objectives of reintegration and how are they achieved? How does the conceptualisation of reintegration translate into practice in disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programmes? This article from Global Governance draws on the case of Liberia to examine the concept and practice of reintegration in post-war societies. It argues that the meaning and use of reintegration, both as a concept and a practice, is overloaded and unclear. This contributes to problematic policy responses and impedes accountability.
Vague and contradictory understandings of reintegration can translate into programmes that lack a clear strategy and lead to unrealistic expectations. The securitisation of reintegration can undermine both development and security objectives by making reintegration a means for achieving security rather than an end in itself. Liberia’s DDR programme indicates that reintegration depends on a mission-specific understanding of the desired endpoints and on matching programming and expectations to objectives and resources. Where reintegration is primarily a security exercise with insufficient resources for development, this should be made clear in advance to minimise misunderstandings and clarify priorities. DDR practitioners should also not assume that other elements of a mission can compensate with regard to development when the aim of reintegration is security.
Analysing DDR in Liberia highlights a number of problems with the concept and practice of reintegration:
- Reintegration is an imprecise basis for programming, being open-ended and encompassing a range of goals. A key unresolved dilemma is whether the aim of reintegration is fundamental social change or mollifying ex-combatants.
- Multiple ideas of what reintegration may achieve are not necessarily a problem. However, the scope and aims of Liberia’s reintegration programme were not clearly conceptualised, with a negative impact on planning decisions early in the process.
- Using reintegration to fulfil security as well as development goals tends to compromise and instrumentalise the original socio-economic aims of reintegration. At the same time it can also undermine the achievement of security goals.
- In Liberia, the securitisation of reintegration led to the transformation of socio-economic goals from an end to a means for achieving security. However, ex-combatants’ expectations of reintegration were not similarly modified.
- Reintegration rests on a number of assumptions about ex-combatants and their relationship to society. In Liberia, these assumptions were not accurate: for example, ex-combatants were not stigmatised and were not worse off than civilians.
- Reintegration should be evaluated according to the specific programme’s priorities. Expedience-focused approaches should be assessed based on security indicators. Transformative approaches should be assessed based on socio-economic measures.
- Regardless of programme priorities, reintegration should also be evaluated according to how it manages and meets expectations and promises and minimises unintended consequences.
- Local knowledge relevant to reintegration, including the characteristics, motivations and legitimacy of armed groups, is important. Such knowledge may point to new approaches, such as de-linking reintegration from disarmament and demobilisation.
- Reintegration programming should recognise the limitations implied by co-opting elite or mid-level spoilers. Co-opting spoilers into governance or security structures can limit the extent to which reintegration of foot soldiers can be transformative.
