Key points
Some of the most common mistakes made in designing civil service reform interventions include:
- Giving insufficient attention to politics and patronage
- Attempting to transplant one country’s structures and practices to another country without due consideration of contexts
- Over-emphasising downsizing and cost-cutting
- Failing to integrate reform activities into a wider policy and organisational framework.
Insufficient attention to politics and patronage
Understanding the political dynamics of a context and anticipating what would motivate stakeholders is likely to be crucial to reform (Unsworth 2007; Robinson 2006). One of the reasons for failed civil service reforms has been taking a technocratic approach (Girishankar et al. 1999) – assuming that the introduction of formal rules is sufficient to change behaviour. The effectiveness of a new system is a function of the political conflicts and compromises that emerge around its implementation (Grindle 2010). Scott’s (2011) literature review of public sector reform finds that more attention needs to be paid to politics in both the design and implementation of reforms.
Without sufficient attention to politics, barriers to reform can arise as a result of organisational silos within the civil service, functional territorialism, unfamiliarity with working together, perceived threats to authority (Turner 2013). Reforms can be left incomplete if political costs outweigh potential gains at the implementation stage (Bunse and Fritz 2012). Patronage (e.g. politicians rewarding supporters with jobs) is often a particularly important challenge in civil service reform (Grindle 2010). It can be of particular detriment to women, who are generally excluded from male-dominated patronage and power networks (Goetz 2003).
When political incentives are correctly judged so that political pay-offs are continuously maintained, reform momentum can remain strong (Robinson 2006). However, it is likely that patronage systems will only be supplanted by career civil service systems slowly, incrementally, and adaptively (Grindle 2010).
Inappropriate transfer of models and practices
Civil service models and practices are context-specific and will not necessarily succeed if transplanted into different contexts (Dolowitz & Marsh 2000). Often, it has been the developing countries with the weakest capacity that have been exposed to the heaviest transfer of experience and ideas from donor countries. Such reforms have generally been unsuited to country context and thus unsuccessful. For example, there is only limited demonstrating the effectiveness of NPM reforms (Joshi 2008).
Comparing the success of New Public Management in Singapore and Bangladesh: developed markets, judiciary and state capacity are critical factors
Sarker (2006) analyses the civil service reforms of Singapore and Bangladesh, arguing that these reforms can be classified under the New Public Management (NPM) model. The author identifies preconditions for successfully establishing NPM programmes: a reasonable level of economic development, including functioning markets, which in turn depend on a well-developed judicial system to ensure the rule of law; basic administrative processes to ensure efficiency and control; and state capacity to undertake reforms decisively.
Whilst Singapore fulfils many of these preconditions, Bangladesh does not:
- Level of economic development and basic public administration processes: Singapore has achieved significant economic growth. It has focused on the establishment of meritocracy, solid organisational frameworks, the rule of law, and public administration accountability. Bangladesh has failed to achieve these.
- Political commitment: In Singapore, political leaders have consistently supported reform implementation. The former Prime Minister, Lee Kaun Yew, repeatedly expressed his commitment to a competent, neutral, and honest civil service. In Bangladesh, efforts to overhaul the administrative system have not been backed by strong political will.
- State capacity: The Singaporean state has become efficient and capable. This is in part due to low levels of political and social pluralism which has helped maintain political stability, kept state decision makers insulated from clientelist groups, and reduced resistance to the formulation and execution of laws. However, state capacity remains a hurdle for NPM-style reform in Bangladesh and other developing countries.
Sarker (2006) suggests that Bangladesh has been susceptible to the pressures of international donor agencies, who have not paid sufficient attention to ensuring buy-in from political leaders and the public bureaucracy. Singapore, Sarker argues, is an example of how capacity building in the public sector can enable economic modernisation and further modernisation of administration along the NPM logic.
Source: Sarker, A. (2006). New public management in developing countries: An analysis of success and failure with particular reference to Singapore and Bangladesh. International Journal of Public Sector Management, 19(2), 180-203.
Downsizing and cost-cutting
Even though the burden of the civil service wage bill is considerable for developing countries, focus on cost-cutting can jeopardise the effectiveness of government and rarely produces lasting savings (Schiavo-Campo & Sundaram, 2001). Downsizing initiatives have often failed to permanently reduce the size of the civil service (Reid 2006) or to improve economic management or service delivery (Girishankar et al. 1999). There can be strong resistance to downsizing initiatives; large-scale involuntary dismissals are often politically difficult (Rama 1999).
However, gradual approaches to reducing the size and cost of the civil service have achieved some success. These have involved, for example, fixed staff structures and partial hiring freezes in Europe and Central Asia (Reid 2006), and strong government commitment and employee participation in Ghana (1980s) and Uganda (1990s) (McCourt 1998; McCourt 2001). In Ghana and Uganda, the government also made provisions for those who were disadvantaged by the process. However, both savings and overall impact were lower than expected (McCourt 2001).
Lack of integration of reform activities
Interventions are only likely to have a lasting impact if they are integrated into wider policy and organisational frameworks and if deeper organisational factors are addressed (McCourt & Sola, 1999). For example, isolated training activities can produce perverse incentives: people may attend donor-funded workshops just to collect ‘per diem’ payments (the ‘carpe per diem’ culture). Placing support for training under project budgets so that it contributes to project objectives has been helpful in ensuring long-term benefits from the training, as has better integration of training activities into wider skills development frameworks. An organisation’s structure and culture and the commitment of line managers impacts the effectiveness of training as a vehicle for reform (McCourt & Sola, 1999).
Reform activities’ lack of integration into wider frameworks has also led to implementation failures in e-government – the use of information and communication technologies (ICT) to improve the activities of public sector organisations. Heeks (2003) notes that the majority of e-government for development projects fail because of the gaps between project designs and on-the-ground reality. In a case study of the implementation of land management information system in Bahir Dar, Ethiopia, the modest measure of success achieved was explained by serious gaps in other, related management systems and structures, as well as staffing, and stakeholder objectives and values (Lessa et al. 2012). Specifically, there was a failure to introduce new salary structures into human resource management systems, or to clearly define promotion levels for ICT staff.
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^Effective public organisations, such as the civil service, evolve through a political process of bargaining between the state and organised groups in society (Unsworth 2007), and reforms are part of an ongoing political process of construction, deconstruction, and reconstruction (Grindle 2010).
Unsworth, S. (2007). Can political science speak to policymakers? Paper presented at PSA Development Politics Group 2nd Annual Conference, 26 January.
See document onlineGrindle, M. (2010). Constructing, deconstructing, and reconstructing career civil service systems in Latin America. Faculty Research Paper Series. RWP 10-025. Harvard Kennedy School, Harvard University. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University.
See document online - ^ Specifically, the ‘establishment control regime’ model, in which departmental organisational structures are agreed with the central personnel office or finance department. Approval is then given for a hierarchical staff structure for each department, expressed in terms of authorised positions, each with a designated grade level. This constitutes an establishment list, and is the basis for both budget making and personnel recruitment and promotion. See further details in: World Bank (n.d.) Establishment Control & Pay Determination. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
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Bunse, S., & Fritz, V. (2012). Making public sector reforms work: political and economic contexts, incentives, and strategies. Policy Research working paper no. WPS 6174. Washington D.C.: World Bank.
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Grindle, M. (2010). Constructing, deconstructing, and reconstructing career civil service systems in Latin America. Faculty Research Paper Series. RWP 10-025. Harvard Kennedy School, Harvard University. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University.
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Goetz, A. (2003). Political cleaners: How women are the new anti-corruption force. Does the evidence wash? Bergen, Norway: U4.
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Girishankar, N., De Silva, M., Grudkova, B. & Gupta, P. (1999). Civil Service Reform: A Review of World Bank Assistance. Operations Evaluation Department, Report No. 19599, World Bank, Washington, D.C.
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Heeks, R. (2003). Most eGovernment-for-Development Projects Fail: How Can Risks be Reduced? Institute for Development Policy and Management. Manchester, UK: University of Manchester.
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Dolowitz, D., & Marsh, D. (2000). Learning from abroad: The role of policy transfer in contemporary policy-making. Governance, 13(1), 5-23.
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Joshi, A. (2008). Producing social accountability? The impact of service delivery reforms. IDS Bulletin, 38(6), 10-17.
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Lessa, L., Negash, S. & Belachew, M. (2012). Steering e-Government Projects from Failure to Success: Using Design-Reality Gap Analysis as a Mid-Implementation Assessment Tool. iGovernment Working Paper Series, Paper No. 22. Institute for Development Policy and Management. Manchester, UK: University of Manchester.
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Rama, M. (1999). Public sector downsizing: An introduction. The World Bank Economic Review, 13(1), 1-22.
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Robinson, M. (2006). The political economy of governance reforms in Uganda. IDS Discussion Paper. Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies.
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Sarker, A. (2006). New public management in developing countries: An analysis of success and failure with particular reference to Singapore and Bangladesh. International Journal of Public Sector Management, 19(2), 180-203.
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Scott, Z. (2011). Evaluation of public sector governance reforms 2001-2011: Literature review. Oxford: Oxford Policy Management.
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Schiavo-Campo, S., & Sundaram, P. (2001). Government employment and compensation – facts and policies. In To serve and to preserve: Improving public administration in a competitive world (pp. 367-420). Manila: Asian Development Bank.
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Turner, M. (2013). Summary report of the public sector governance reform evaluation. DFID, Sida, Irish Aid and Oxford Policy Management.
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Unsworth, S. (2007). Can political science speak to policymakers? Paper presented at PSA Development Politics Group 2nd Annual Conference, 26 January.
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McCourt, W. (1998). Employment and pay reform: A guide to assistance. London: Department for International Development.
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McCourt, W. (2001). Towards a strategic model of employment reform: Explaining and remedying experience to date. International Journal of Human Resource Management, 12, 56-75.
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Reid, G. (2006). Human resource management issues in ECA countries. Background paper for Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union Public Finance and Economic Growth: Lessons from Several High Growth Success Stories. Washington, DC: World Bank.
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McCourt, W., & Sola, N. (1999). Using training to promote civil service reform: A Tanzanian local government case study. Public Administration and Development, 19, 63-75.
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Amundsen I. (2009). Introduction to public sector ethics. In I. Amundsen & V. P de Andrade (Eds.), Public sector ethics: Compendium for teaching at the Catholic University of Angola (pp. 5-45). Bergen, Norway: Chr. Michelsen Institute.
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Garcia-Sanchez, I., Rodriguez-Dominguez, L., & Gallego-Alvarez, I. (2011). Effectiveness of ethics codes in the public sphere: Are they useful in controlling corruption? International Journal of Public Administration, 34, 190-95.
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In the establishment control regime model, departmental organisational structures are agreed with the central personnel office or finance department. Approval is then given for a hierarchical staff structure for each department, expressed in terms of authorised positions, each with a designated grade level. This constitutes an establishment list, and is the basis for both budget making and personnel recruitment and promotion. See further details in: World Bank (n.d.) Establishment Control & Pay Determination. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.