Why has Public Sector Governance Reform (PSGR) carried out in developing countries over the past decade not been effective? How can such interventions be improved? This literature review shows how much of the existing research emphasises underlying political economy and incentive problems, and the need for reforms to be demand-led rather than externally-driven. A fundamental rethink is needed on the way PSGRs are carried out: more attention needs to be paid to politics in both the design and the implementation of reforms.
PSGRs relate to complex and ill-defined problems within parts of the public service, which is itself an interdependent system embedded within wider systems of society and culture. This study focuses on four main areas: (1) reforms of the role of the state, (2) central government reforms, (3) civil service system reform and (3) reforms to accountability and oversight mechanisms.
The development literature on PSGR is full of discussion over what has happened (a lot) and what the outcome has been (generally negative). There is very little in the literature, however, on ‘why’ certain reforms took place, what the ‘problem’ was that they were aiming to change and what the underlying ‘theory of change’ was that led to the particular design of the solution. Two further gaps in the PSGR literature are: 1) little serious discussion of gender and diversity issues; and 2) weak analysis of aid modalities in relation to PSGR.
In previous decades, there was an emphasis on technical approaches to PSGRs. However, the real difficulty lies not in technical design but in understanding and addressing other underlying problems. These relate to the political economy of governance reforms, such as the interplay between formal and informal governance systems in developing countries. They also relate to the underlying incentives of partner governments and donor agencies.
Obstacles to reform involve both design and implementation challenges. Problems with the design of PSGRs include the following:
- A failure to consider political dynamics and a lack of genuine ownership of reforms because they are not demand-led
- Weak diagnostic tools and no globally recognised conceptual framework, leading to reforms often being based on poor diagnostic work and missing a robust ‘theory of change’
- Support among donors for imported models of reform and short-term approaches.
Even if the design stage of reforms works well, PSGRs are often not fully implemented. For example, reforms founder because of:
- A lack of ‘political commitment’ or limited ownership
- Poor organisational culture within the public sector and weak state capacity
- Problems among donors with staff attrition, predictability of funding and sequencing
- Wider contextual barriers such as political volatility and weak information management.
If development practitioners and donors want to move forward on PSGR existing research suggests that they need to pay more attention to politics, in both the design and the implementation of reforms:
- Reforms require strong domestic leadership – externally-led attempts at PSGRs are unlikely to be successful or sustainable.
- Incremental approaches to reform are more likely to be sustainable and politically feasible.
- The timing and sequencing of reforms should be major considerations: undertaking too many reforms too quickly leads to ineffectiveness.
- Donors should consider how they can support citizens in creating public pressure for reform.
- Poor public sector performance must be addressed, although there is no consensus on how to do this. Suggestions include: increased staffing levels, pay reform, more performance management and support for organisational change.
- Donor behaviour and systems need to change so that support is more long-term, predictable and not entangled with perverse incentives.
