Empirical research across a variety of contexts consistently demonstrates that political actors can have weak incentives to invest in broad-based, inclusive public services, often preferring to deliver goods that are targetable towards their own political constituencies. The so-called ‘long-route’ of accountability between citizens and their political representatives may become dysfunctional where there is information asymmetry, an absence of programmatic political parties, and social fragmentation. For example, lack of information about the quality of provision, particularly a problem in health and education, makes it difficult for citizens to know and credit/blame the state for weak or poor performance.
Whilst politics and institutions can block reform, they may also enable progress in other cases. Remarkable improvements have been made in some cases where there has been a stable political settlement, political entrepreneurship, and long-term policy continuity.
Keefer, P., & Khemani, S. (2003). Democracy, Public Expenditures and the Poor (Policy research working paper 3164). Washington D.C.: World Bank.
Countries vary systematically in terms of the incentives of politicians to provide public goods. Even in democracies, politicians often divert resources to political rents and private transfers, for the good of the few. Three main political market imperfections are especially pertinent. These are: Lack of information, social fragmentation, and the lack of credibility of political promises to citizens. These factors explain why services perform poorly in Uttar Pradesh poorly in comparison with the well performing services of Kerala.
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Booth, D. (2011). Towards a theory of local governance and public goods provision. IDS Bulletin, 42(2), 11-21.
This synthesis of research on service provision in Africa suggests much of the observed variation in outcomes is attributable to common institutional problems. These include the degree to which there is: a coherent vision underpinning how resources are allocated; effective top-down performance disciplines and; locally-anchored institutions enabling collective action and problem-solving. Other variables include the incidence of populist policy-making, and whether aid generates negative incentives.
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Bell, C. (2011). Buying Support and Buying Time: The Effect of Regime Consolidation on Public Goods Provision. International Studies Quarterly, 55(3), 625-646.
This study uses quantitative testing to assess temporal variation in the provision of 15 public goods. It finds that regime consolidation changes leaders’ incentives for provision. New political leaders face institutional challenges – such as coups and revolutions – that affect spending priorities. States with inclusive institutions spend more on public goods as they consolidate and become less vulnerable to elite demands.
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Khemani, S. (2013). Buying Votes vs. Supplying Public Services: Political Incentives to Under-Invest in Pro-Poor Policies (Policy research working paper 6339). Washington D.C.: World Bank
Vote buying in poor economies is associated with lower provision of public services that disproportionately benefit the poor. Data from the Philippines, reveals a significant, robust negative correlation between vote buying and the delivery of primary health services. In places where households report more vote buying, government records show that municipalities invest less in basic health services for mothers and children. A higher percentage of children are severely under-weight in those municipalities.
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Chambers, V., and Golooba-Mutebi. (2012). Is the bride too beautiful? Safe motherhood in rural Rwanda (APPP research report 4). London: ODI.
Rwanda has made impressive progress in maternal health, particularly in rural locations. The coherence of the policy environment has been a key element, particularly clear lines of responsibility and mandates. Laxity in professional standards and lack of motivation have been overcome by accountability mechanisms which serve as strong deterrents against misconduct by all actors responsible for service provision. Accompanying performance pressures based on consistent incentives comprising rewards and punishment ensure that all actors work toward the same objective of providing high-quality services.
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Mcloughlin, C., & Batley, R. (2012). The politics of what works in service delivery: An evidence-based review. Manchester: Effective States and Inclusive Development (ESID).
Some forms of politics are likely to promote inclusive social provisioning and enable, as opposed to constrain, improvements in service outcomes. Particularly key are the influence of periods of crisis and transition which throw the rules into flux; whether the political settlement is inclusive and stable; the types of calculations of political returns being made by political actors at all levels. Inclusive provision is also likely where the state derives its legitimacy through the provision of an historically salient service.
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